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ABSTRACT
This paper takes a step toward providing a general equilibrium framework within which to study the
nub of the current fiscal debate around the world: what are the tradeoffs between short-run stabilization
and long-run sustainability when the perceived riskiness of government debt depends, in part, on the
current and expected fiscal environment in place? We calibrate a simple model to Swedish fiscal data
in two periods: before and after the financial crisis of the early 1990s. We compute the dynamic fiscal
limit, which depends on the peak of the Laffer curve, for the pre-crisis and three alternative post-crisis
fiscal policies. The model simulates the macroeconomic consequences of alternative policies in the
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1 Introduction
The current worldwide recession has brought with it a chorus of calls from economists for
substantial ﬁscal stimulus. Along with this chorus has been a discordant cry for ﬁscal dis-
cipline. In few countries has the ensemble of ﬁscal policy debate been more apparent than
in Sweden. One side of the debate has been represented by the Swedish Fiscal Policy Coun-
cil’s (2009b, p. 1) annual report, which stated: “The large downward revisions of economic
forecasts since the Budget Bill justiﬁes, in our opinion, stronger stimulus measures this year
than those taken up to now,” and “Additional stimulus measures beyond those announced
by the Government should probably be taken in 2010.” The government’s response was
that Sweden’s ﬁscal system has strong automatic stabilizers that ensure a substantial ﬁscal
stimulus in response to the recession. Moreover, in light of such strong automatic stabiliz-
ers, additional discretionary stimulus could endanger Sweden’s one percent surplus target,
threatening ﬁscal credibility [Swedish Ministry of Finance (2009); Borg (2009)]. Incredible
ﬁscal policies could induce ﬁnancial markets to penalize Sweden by attaching risk premia to
its sovereign debt, in a rerun of the 1990s.
A similar debate is playing out around the world as governments struggle to ﬁnd an
appropriate ﬁscal response to the recession. Most countries, though, do not have Sweden’s
ﬁscal policy infrastructure, which serves to institutionalize public ﬁscal discourse. The com-
bination of explicit rules to guide ﬁscal decisions and an independent ﬁscal council with
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access to the Parliament provides a context that makes the ground in Sweden especially
fertile for constructive debate.
American ﬁscal policy provides a sharp contrast. Despite its current record budget deﬁcits
and long-term projections that imply current policy is unsustainable, ﬁscal discussions are
dominated by politics, with little serious economic analysis to buttress the arguments.1
American ﬁscal decisions are not guided by any obvious economically based rules and what
“rules” do exist are easily circumvented by the political process or accounting tricks. In
principle, serious analysis is provided by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO). In practice,
the CBO’s leadership is chosen by the majority party in Congress, an institutional feature
that is not conducive to encouraging independent and critical analysis of ﬁscal proposals and
decisions.
One reason for the sharp diﬀerences in ﬁscal policy infrastructure across the two countries
is that the United States has no fresh memory of ﬁscal crises that called into question the
“risklessness” of its central government debt. Sweden has such a memory: as recently as
1993, Swedish debt was downgraded in the aftermath of Sweden’s worst banking crisis in
the post-World War II period. Out of that crisis grew Sweden’s current monetary and ﬁscal
policy framework, an important element of which is transparency and open debate about
macroeconomic policies.
This paper takes a step toward providing a general equilibrium framework within which
to study the nub of the current ﬁscal debate around the world: what are the tradeoﬀs
between short-run stabilization and long-run sustainability when the perceived riskiness of
government debt depends, in part, on the ﬁscal environment in place?
We employ a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model similar to Bi’s (2009)
in which the government ﬁnances spending and lump-sum transfers with a distorting income
tax and debt. Sovereign debt, however, need not be risk-free. Distorting taxes imply that
there are limits to the government’s ability to raise revenues because higher tax rates create
disincentives to work that counteract the positive revenue eﬀects of the higher rates. The
resulting dynamic Laﬀer curve generates a distribution for the economy’s ﬁscal limit. Even
if the government is able to raise revenues, it may not be willing to do so. We treat that will-
ingness as a political decision that is unrelated to the economic fundamentals. Each period
an eﬀective ﬁscal limit is realized as a draw from the ﬁscal limit distribution. If outstand-
ing debt exceeds the eﬀective limit, the government (partially) defaults on its obligations.
Forward-looking economic agents forecast the probability of default at some point in the
future and factor that probability into their decisions.
We calibrate the model to Swedish ﬁscal data in two periods: before and after the ﬁnancial
1See Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009a,b) for some ﬁscal accounting exercises.
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crisis of the early 1990s. Before the crisis, transfers and average tax rates were higher than
they have been since the crisis. In addition, government spending seems to have changed from
being countercyclical before the crisis to procyclical after the crisis. We compute the dynamic
ﬁscal limit for the pre-crisis and three alternative post-crisis ﬁscal policies. The alternative
policies include ones that Sweden has implemented—a smaller government size, as measured
by the share of transfers and revenues in GDP; a change to procyclical government spending;
the imposition of a ceiling on government expenditures, the sum of spending and transfers.
The model simulates the macroeconomic consequences of alternative policies in the face of
the sequence of bad output shocks that Sweden experienced from 1991–1997.
Our approach begins to ﬁll a critical hole in the literature. Because ﬁscal policies are
typically evaluated in structural models that do not allow for the possibility of sovereign debt
default, those evaluations are unreliable when applied to economies where ﬁnancial markets
regard government debt as risky.2 Given Sweden’s experience in the 1990s, it is clear that
treating Swedish government debt at “risk-free” in all states of the world could produce
profoundly misleading conclusions.
This paper diﬀers from the literature of strategic default that has grown out of the
early papers by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Eaton et al. (1986). Those authors model
default on external debt as an optimal and strategic decision made by the government,
which emphasizes the willingness of the government to service its debt. A large literature
on international borrowing in emerging markets has expanded on this approach [see, for
example, Arellano (2008), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Mendoza and Yue (2008)]. However,
that literature makes predictions that are sharply at odds with data: either the default
frequency is far too high or the level of debt at which default occurs is far too low. Although
eﬀorts to model default as a strategic decision are well meaning, they are unlikely in their
current form to shed useful light on the current ﬁscal policy debates.
A key conclusion emerges from our analysis: the right kinds of ﬁscal reforms—speciﬁcally,
the adoption of certain classes of ﬁscal rules—can shift the economy’s ﬁscal limit in important
ways and dramatically reduce the likelihood that sovereign debt will be assessed a risk
premium, even in the face of bad economic shocks like those that hit Sweden in the 1990s.
Concluding remarks discuss useful extensions to the analysis that would allow a richer set
of conclusions to be drawn.
2Examples of the typical ﬁscal analyses abound. Here are a few: Romer and Bernstein (2009), Cogan
et al. (2009), Cwik and Wieland (2009), Eggertsson (2009), Christiano et al. (2009), Davig and Leeper (2009),
Uhlig (2009), Leeper et al. (2009), Coenen et al. (2009).
3Bi & Leeper: Risk Premia and Fiscal Policy in Sweden
2 The Early 1990s: Impetus to Policy Reform
In the early 1990s Sweden experienced a boom-bust cycle that severely tested the prevail-
ing monetary-ﬁscal policy regime.3 After deregulation of the ﬁnancial system, the economy
boomed in the late 1980s, with rapid growth in GDP, employment, consumption, and im-
ports. Despite a worsening current account balance, monetary policy was prevented from
reacting to the boom because the krona was pegged to a basket of currencies.
By 1989–1990 the boom had ended and the bust began. Rising international real interest
rates exerted further pressure on the pegged krona while simultaneously the Riksbank raised
nominal interest rates to defend the krona against speculative attacks. Major tax reform in
1990–1991 sharply lowered marginal tax rates and reduced mortgage deductibility, raising
real after-tax interest rates still more. The strong increases in real rates deﬂated asset values,
which reduced wealth and triggered a banking crisis.
The resulting recession was comparable to Sweden’s experience in the Great Depression.
GDP fell for three consecutive years. Unemployment rose from 1.5 percent in 1989 to over
8 percent in 1993. The cumulative employment loss exceeded that of the Great Depression,
on the order of 16 percent, according to Jonung and Hagberg (2005) and Jonung (2009).
Attacks on the krona continued, culminating in the famous instance on September 16, 1992
when the Riksbank raised the overnight rate to 500 percent.4 In the event, by November 19
the Riksbank allowed the krona to ﬂoat.
Large automatic stabilizers built into Swedish ﬁscal rules swung the general government
balance from a 5 percent surplus in 1989 to nearly a 12 percent deﬁcit in 1993.5 Central
government debt rose from 30 percent to 80 percent of GDP over the same period.
The Swedish government responded with a thorough reform of both monetary and ﬁscal
policy. Beginning in January 1993, the Riksbank announced a 2 percent target for CPI
inﬂation, applying from 1995 on. This target was formalized by the Sveriges Riksbank Act,
passed in 1997, an act that greatly reinforced the Riksbank’s independence [Sveriges Riks-
bank (2008)]. Fiscal policy in 1993 consolidated in ﬁts and starts, but projections showed
government debt continuing to grow rapidly and fears of sustainability arose. Progress on
ﬁscal reform was motivated by at least three concerns. First, bond markets downgraded
Swedish sovereign debt in 1993. Second, by the end of 1993 one-third of government ex-
penditures were devoted to debt service. Third, it was recognized that ﬁscal instability
could undermine the Riksbank’s newly adopted inﬂation targeting regime. A series of bills
3This section draws liberally from Swedish Ministry of Finance (2001), Jonung and Hagberg (2005),
Jonung (2009), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008), and Wetterberg (2009).
4The Riksbank had plans to go as high as 4000 percent [Swedish Ministry of Finance (2001)].
5Sweden is known for having unusually strong automatic stabilizers [Flod´ en (2009), Calmfors (2009)].
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beginning in late 1994, called the “Consolidation Programme,” sought to stabilize debt by
adopting both a nominal expenditures ceiling and a surplus target. By 1998 the budget had
swung back to surplus and debt was on a downward trajectory.
Jonung (2009) lists macroeconomic policy reforms as critical factors in resolving crises in
both the ﬁnancial sector and the real economy. Swedish policies continue to be guided by
the reforms that grew out of the crises.
3 Empirical Work on Interest Rates and Government Debt
It is widely known that the empirical literature lacks consensus on the eﬀects of government
debt and deﬁcits upon interest rates. Barth et al. (1991) surveys 42 earlier papers through
1989, of which 17 claimed positive eﬀects, 19 showed negative eﬀects, and 6 found mixed
eﬀects. Gale and Orszag (2003) review recent studies and conclude that current deﬁcits
tend to have a signiﬁcant impact on interest rates if deﬁcit expectations are incorporated.
Canzoneri et al. (2002) use the U.S. Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s projected surpluses and
ﬁnd that an increase in projected future deﬁcits averaging one percent of current GDP raises
the long-term interest rate relative to the short-term rate of 53 to 60 basis points. Laubach
(2003) uses projections from CBO and the U.S. Oﬃce of Management and Budget and ﬁnds
that a one percentage point increase in the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio raises long-term interest
rates by 25 basis point. Nevertheless, Engen and Hubbard (2004) claim that a one percent
increase in government debt, regardless of whether it is expected or current debt, increases
the real interest rate by a trivial 3 basis points.
More recently, Chinn and Frankel (2005) show that current and expected levels of debt
do aﬀect long-term interest rates in Europe and the United States, but the estimates are
sensitive to the sample period. Ardagna et al. (2007) ﬁnd that a one percentage point increase
in the primary deﬁcit leads to a 10 basis point increase in the long-term rate, while public
debt has a nonlinear eﬀect. Ardagna (2009) identiﬁes periods of large ﬁscal contractions and
expansions in OECD countries, and then studies how the large changes aﬀect interest rates.
She shows that interest rates fall around episodes of ﬁscal consolidations and rise around
periods of ﬁscal expansion.
A second line of work focuses on the relationship between default risk premia, instead
of interest rates, and ﬁscal policy. Unfortunately, there is also lack of consensus in these
studies. Using the yield on various countries’ bonds issued in Deutsche marks, Lønning (2000)
ﬁnds that yield diﬀerentials, despite being very small, are correlated with bond ratings and
various macroeconomic variables. Focusing on U.S. data, Dai and Philippon (2006) use an
aﬃne-term-structure model and ﬁnd that a one percent increase in the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio
increases the 10-year rate by 40 to 50 basis points, with half of the increase attributable
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to risk premia. In contrast, Heppke-Falk and H¨ ufner (2004) estimate a model of France,
Germany and Italy and fail to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of the expected deﬁcit on the swap
spread.
Some papers ﬁnd that the relationship is both state-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc. Alesina
et al. (1992) compare 12 OECD countries and ﬁnd that sovereign default risks are aﬀected
by the debt level at high levels of debt, but not inﬂuenced by the debt level at low levels of
debt. Codogno et al. (2003) ﬁnd that default risk explains a substantial part of changes in
yield spreads in Italy and Spain, but not in other EU countries.
Other studies identify nonlinear relationships. Bayoumi et al. (1995) ﬁnd a strong nonlin-
ear relationship between municipal bond yields and debt variables for U.S. states. Bernoth
et al. (2006) focus on European countries between 1993 and 2005 and ﬁnd that debt service
ratios raise spreads nonlinearly. Haugh et al. (2009) analyze large movements in the sovereign
yield spreads between Germany and other European countries in the current ﬁnancial crisis
and ﬁnd that deteriorations in ﬁscal performance increase the spread in a nonlinear way.
The relationship between ﬁscal measures and interest rates is quite complex. It depends
on how, when,a n dwhy ﬁscal deﬁcits and debt rise. Traum and Yang (2009) estimate the
crowding out eﬀects of government debt in a new Keynesian model. They show that debt
expansions induced by higher spending can have very diﬀerent eﬀects than those induced by
lower taxes. There can also be intricate dynamics linking ﬁscal actions to interest rates—
dynamics that are also aﬀected by monetary policy behavior. Finally, it matters a great deal
whether the debt expansion arises from an endogenous response of ﬁscal policy to macroeco-
nomic developments or whether ﬁscal expansion is exogenous. Reduced-form studies cannot
shed light on these critical aspects, which is why the ﬁndings reported above are all over the
map.
Two broad methodological points emerge from this vast empirical literature. First, the
thought experiment that generates the debt expansion must be carefully controlled. This
requires explicit economic theory and cannot be achieved through purely empirical analysis,
however sophisticated the statistical techniques employed. Second, it is important to allow
for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between ﬁscal policy and interest rates. Below
we report a theoretical framework within which these two points are addressed.
4 Swedish Fiscal Policy
Even raw time series data on Swedish ﬁscal variables and real GDP reveal some interesting
patterns that are important for our subsequent theoretical analysis.
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4.1 Fiscal Data: 1970 to 2007 Figure 1 plots three ﬁscal variables as ratios of GDP—
transfers, government spending and tax revenues (solid lines, measured on the right axis)—
against detrended real GDP (dashed lines, measured on the left axis) in the left panel and
against the debt-GDP ratio in the right panel. After the initial doubling of the level of trans-
fers in the mid-to-late 1980s, transfers have been largely stable, except for the substantial
spike during the early 1990s crisis. Government spending, in contrast, tends to ﬂuctuate
quite a bit more. Both transfers and government spending exhibit clear countercyclical
patterns, while revenues are procyclical.
Revenues as a share of GDP provide a rough guide to the average tax rate in the economy.
The tax rate reached a peak in the late 1980s, then fell steadily for ﬁve years, before achieving
another peak around 2000. Since then the average level of taxes has declined steadily.
Government debt displays two distinct humps—the ﬁrst associated with the 1970s run-
up in transfers and spending and the second associated with the early 1990s crisis. There
is some tendency for revenues to adjust with a lag to swings in government debt, as the
right panels show. Government spending and transfers, on the other hand, appear to lead
movements in debt.
Figure 2 repeats the previous graph, but plots detrended levels of transfers and govern-
ment spending against detrended real GDP in the left panels and the debt-GDP ratio in the
right panels. Detrended transfers steadily increased in 1970s and stayed at high levels in
1980s and early 1990s. After experiencing a large spike in 1992, they have steadily decreased.
The cyclicality of detrended government spending diﬀers markedly from the spending-GDP
ratio in ﬁgure 1: detrended spending is countercyclical before the 1991 crisis and becomes
much less countercyclical after (possibly even procyclical). This diﬀerence underscores that
the spending-GDP ratio may give misleading impressions of the cyclical nature of government
spending, as the ratio can rise in recessions even when the level is falling.
Detrended data seem to make the timing relations between ﬁscal variables and debt more
clear. When either detrended transfers or government spending are rising, debt as a share
of GDP tends to rise with a lag. This pattern seems to be fairly robust across time. As in
the previous ﬁgure, tax adjustments tend to follow movements in debt.
In what follows, we shall use these data to calibrate a formal theoretical model of Swedish
ﬁscal behavior.
4.2 Fiscal Rules The ﬁscal framework was introduced in 1993, when the ﬁscal deﬁcit
reached 12 percent of GDP and total government expenditures reached 60 percent of GDP.6
6Total government expenditure includes both lump-sum transfers— deﬁned as the sum of social security
payments, net capital transfers and subsidies—and government purchases—deﬁned as the sum of government
ﬁnal consumption and consumption of ﬁxed capital.
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Since then, the Swedish government has been able to reduce public expenditures from 60
percent of GDP in 1993 to 45 percent of GDP in 2007 by reducing social beneﬁts, public
subsidies, capital expenditures and public consumption.
Sweden’s ﬁscal framework consists of three components covering both central and local
governments, which are summarized in Dumas (2004). First, a ceiling on total expenditures,
excluding interest payments, was introduced at the central government level (operational
rule) in 1997. The ceilings are set in nominal terms for three years on a rolling basis.7 The
multi-year budget forecast is updated for the year after the budget year and to add a third
year to the projection.8 Sweden’s Ministry of Finance prepares the budget and presents
it to Riksdag (the Parliament), which votes on the expenditure ceiling and how to divide
the budget into 27 expenditure areas. The ceiling also includes a reserve for contingencies.
Reserves arise when the total amount allocated to expenditure areas falls below the ceiling.
In principle, the reserve acts as a “rainy-day fund,” to be used during economic downturns
when revenues decline sharply. Past practice has sometimes fallen short of this ideal, with
reserves used to ﬁnance discretionary expenditures.
Second, a budget surplus target has been adopted at the general government level. A
target of 1 percent of GDP over the cycle has been chosen to ensure that Sweden’s aging
population will not cause public ﬁnances to deteriorate. The target was changed from 2
percent to 1 percent in 2007 as a response to Eurostat’s decision that funded pension sys-
tems (such as the Swedish premium pension system) are reported in the household sector,
rather than in the general government sector [Lindh and Ljungman (2007)]. It is diﬃcult
to operationalize a surplus target, as there is no consensus on how to measure the cyclically
adjusted budget balance, so the target is best treated as a medium-term objective [Boije and
Fischer (2006a,b)].
Third, a balanced budget at the local government level was introduced in 2000. The local
governments’ budgets have to be balanced ex ante, meaning that the local government must
present a plan to cover the deﬁcit within two years if they are in deﬁcit ex post.
Sovereign debt ratings agencies have endorsed Sweden’s ﬁscal reforms. After the 1993
downgrade of Swedish debt, Standard & Poor’s (1997) revised its long-term foreign currency
rating outlook for Sweden from negative to stable, largely due to “expected ﬁscal strength-
7Dumas (2004) claims that “the expenditure ceiling is consistent with the budget surplus target,” while
Ljungman (2008) says that “no explicit principles for calculating the expenditure ceilings are presented.” The
Swedish Fiscal Policy Council has argued that at the same time that opportunities to circumvent the ceiling
should be reduced, there also ought to be well-established escape causes. These changes would enhance the
credibility of the ceiling, according to the Council [see Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2009b,a)].
8The macroeconomic assumptions for the ﬁscal projections are biased downwards in order to limit the
risk of excessive optimism about revenues. Savings are intended to be used to reduce debt, but in practice
they may be used to increase expenditures.
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ening” arising from the reforms. In the context of the current economic downturn, Standard
& Poor’s (2009) writes, “The established ﬁscal rules have served Sweden well” and, “the
Kingdom’s substantial ﬁscal buﬀers to support its creditworthiness in the current adverse
economic environment.” Despite the decline in ﬁscal performance as a result of rising gov-
ernment spending and declining tax revenue, rating agencies believe that the deterioration
in public ﬁnances will be temporary as the Swedish government has a solid history of ﬁscal
discipline and credible rules in place. One warning from Standard & Poor’s is that Sweden’s
high tax rates limit its ﬁscal ﬂexibility and put Sweden in an unfavorable position relative
to its peers. Fiscal ﬂexibility, as the simulations below and Bi’s (2009) work show, is critical
for avoiding sovereign debt risk premia.
5 A Formal Model of Fiscal Policy and Debt Default
We employ an extremely simple theoretical model that draws heavily from Bi (2009). Tech-
nical details about the model appear in appendix A.
5.1 Sketch of Model A representative household lives in a closed economy and makes
choices of consumption, leisure, and savings. We abstract from capital accumulation, so all
savings is in the form of government bonds. We also abstract from nominal considerations:
bonds are denominated in consumption goods. The government ﬁnances its purchases of
goods and its lump-sum transfers to the representative household with a proportional tax
levied against labor income and with bond sales.
Productivity is an important source of uncertainty in the model. The household knows
the stochastic process governing total factor productivity and is aware of the rules governing
policy behavior. It uses that information, in conjunction with knowledge of the economy, to
form rational expectations over the objects that are important to its decisions.
In contrast to most formal economic models, in this model government debt is risky be-
cause the government may choose to default, at least partially, on its liabilities to consumers.
Bonds take a simple form: households may buy a bond in year t from the government at
the price qt; if the bond were risk-free, the government would pay the household one unit of
goods in year t + 1 and the gross rate of return on the bond would be 1/qt. Because bonds
are risky, if the government partially defaults, the household will receive only a fraction—
1 − Δt+1, a number between 0 and 1—of the risk-free payoﬀ. Denote that expected fraction
by Et(1−Δt+1), reﬂecting the fact that when the household buys the bond in year t,i td o e s
not know what payoﬀ it will receive, since the payoﬀ does not occur until year t +1 . I ft h e
government defaults, the gross rate of return is reduced to (1 − Δt+1)/qt.
The household faces a fundamental problem that drives most of its economic decisions.
9Bi & Leeper: Risk Premia and Fiscal Policy in Sweden
Random ﬂuctuations in productivity make the household’s wage income volatile. If the
household always consumed its after-tax income, consumption would also be volatile, with
the household binging when times are good and starving when times are bad. But such wild
swings in consumption make the household unhappy.9 The household solves its fundamental
problem of how to keep its consumption smooth by adjusting its savings to buﬀer itself
against income ﬂuctuations. In this simple model, savings take the form of government
bond holdings.
The possibility that government may default on its debt adds a dimension of uncertainty
against which the household will want to hedge. It does this by factoring the possibility of
default into the pricing of government bonds. The more likely is default—or the larger is
the anticipated fraction of default—the less the household will be willing to pay for a bond
(the lower will be qt). To word this diﬀerently, savers demand a higher rate of return to hold
riskier government debt, driving up interest rates economy-wide.
5.2 Government Default and the Fiscal Limit The nature of the risk that the
household faces and how the household copes with that risk lie at the heart of the model.
Ideally, we would model the intrinsically strategic decision a government reaches when it
chooses to default. As noted in the introduction, however, existing political economy models
tend to make predictions that are wildly at odds with the observed behavior by governments,
such as that governments default at extremely low debt-GDP ratios. In addition, this paper
focuses more on how institutional changes to ﬁscal behavior can alter the probability of
default than on the reasons a government might default. For our purposes, it is useful
as a ﬁrst pass to treat the decision to default as exogenous, being determined outside the
economic model.
Most taxes distort economic behavior and those distortions have important implications
for how much revenue the government collects. Suppose the tax on labor income is increased.
If the household’s work eﬀort remained unchanged, then the tax base would also remain ﬁxed
and tax revenues would rise unambiguously. But the household responds to incentives, so its
behavior is unlikely to remain unchanged. Higher income taxes reduce the after-tax return
to working, which tends to induce households to work less hard.10 The resulting impact on
revenue collections is ambiguous, but generally at low tax rates, higher rates raise revenues,
while at higher tax rates, higher rates can actually reduce revenues. This phenomenon,
dubbed the “Laﬀer curve,” is ubiquitous to environments in which taxes distort, but the
9They are also inconsistent with the well-established fact that in data consumption is much less volatile
than income.
10This “substitution eﬀect” may be oﬀset to some extent by the “income eﬀect,” by which the household
will tend to work harder because higher taxes reduce its income. Empirical evidence tends to suggest that
the negative substitution eﬀect outweighs the positive income eﬀect on work eﬀort.
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precise details are highly model-speciﬁc.11
Figure 3 reports a simpliﬁed Laﬀer curve for the model we use. It is simpliﬁed because
all randomness in the model has been stripped away, so it reports how steady state revenues
vary with the labor tax rate. In the ﬁgure, the tax rate that maximizes revenues occurs
where the curves reach their maximum height [see appendix A.3 for further discussion].
Along the black dotted-dashed line, for example, revenues reach a peak at a tax rate of 70
percent. At tax rates below 70 percent, revenues rise as rates rise, while at tax rates above
70 percent, revenues decline as rates rise. The ﬁgure also illustrates that the position of the
curve depends, among other things, on how elastic labor supply is with respect to after-tax
wages. The more sensitive labor supply is to wages, the lower is the tax rate that maximizes
revenues. In the graph, greater sensitivity is associated with a higher Frisch elasticity.
The existence of a Laﬀer curve carries important implications for ﬁscal policy. It implies
that at any point in time, there is a maximum level of revenues that the government can
raise. Setting aside adjustments in government expenditures for the moment, a maximum
level of revenues implies a limit to how much debt the government can support. Placed in a
dynamic setting, it implies that there is always an upper bound to the expected discounted
present value of revenues. Unlike ﬁgure 3, actual Laﬀer curves are both dynamic—changing
over time with economic conditions—and stochastic—varying randomly as diﬀerent shocks
hit the economy.
A Laﬀer curve produces a ﬁscal limit: if the present value of revenues is bounded, then
there is a limit to how much debt it is feasible for the government to service. The dynamic
and stochastic nature of the Laﬀer curve means that the ﬁscal limit changes over time
and that the limit is not a ﬁxed number; it is a probability distribution that depends on
many features of the economy—various elasticities determined by private sector behavior,
the nature of policy behavior, and the properties of the random disturbances hitting the
economy.
In a closed-economy model, any debt that the government sells must be bought by do-
mestic households. But there are also limits to how much debt households are willing to
accumulate. If the household saves too much, then it is achieving a lower consumption path
than it otherwise could and if it saves too little, then it is not smoothing its consumption as
eﬀectively as it might.
If government debt is risk-free, these considerations impose restrictions on the ﬁscal
policies that are consistent with equilibrium, or, what are commonly called “sustainable.”
11Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) use formal economic models to compute Laﬀer curves for the United States
and European Union countries and infer that Denmark and Sweden are on the “slippery side” of their curves,
where lower tax rates will raise revenues.
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Sustainable policies imply that an intertemporal equilibrium condition, labeled (IEC), must
always hold
Value of Government Bonds =
Expected Present Value of Future Net Surpluses (IEC)
where
Net Surpluses = Total Revenues − Government Consumption & Investment
− Government Transfer Payments
To obtain the ﬁscal limit, we set tax rates to maximize revenues at in each date and
denote the maximum sustainable level of debt in year t by B∗




t = Expected Present Value (T
∗ − Government Expenditures) (FL–IEC)
The present value in (FL–IEC) depends on the expected path of interest rates when tax
rates are always set at the peak of the Laﬀer curve. Given the model and settings of the
parameters of the model, it is possible to compute the distribution of the ﬁscal limit, B∗
t,f o r
each year t.
5.3 Government Behavior Government in this model behaves quite simply. It sets
the levels of spending and transfers “automatically” as a function of the productivity of
the economy. This abstraction is intended to mimic the sizeable automatic stabilizers that
are built into the Swedish ﬁscal system, by which spending and transfer payments tend to
expand when the economy contracts, and vice versa. We could extend these rules by adding
an autonomous aspect to spending and transfers decisions, but this would not alter the basic
messages of the paper.
To make this behavior systematic, we posit that transfers in year t, zt,r e s p o n da u -
tomatically to productivity with an elasticity of αz, while the corresponding elasticity for
government spending is αg. When expenditure policies are countercyclical, these α’s are
negative, so expenditures rise when productivity is low; procyclical policies arise when the
α’s are positive.
If spending and transfers are evolving in lockstep with productivity, then taxes must
be responding to the state of government debt in order to ensure that the intertemporal
equilibrium condition holds. We posit an equally simple, but endogenous rule governing
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the tax rate in the economy: whenever debt adjusted for any default that might occur rises
above the long-run level of debt, taxes rise by an amount γ. This reaction of taxes to debt
must be suﬃciently strong to guarantee that (IEC) is always satisﬁed. That is, the policy
parameter γ must be positive and large enough to stabilize debt. Endogeneity of tax policy
is essential for an equilibrium to exist. A fully credible commitment of the government to
such a rule, which is also well understood by the private sector, anchors private expectations
on policies that are sustainable.
Instead of having only taxes adjust to stabilize debt, one could permit adjustments also
on the expenditures side. We do not pursue this avenue in this paper for two reasons. First,
in Sweden, as in many European countries, the populace seems more resistant to spending
cuts than to tax increases. Second, allowing for adjustments in government expenditures
does not alter the basic message of the model, as Bi (2009) shows.
Finally, like the household, the government must satisfy a budget constraint each period.
This constraint requires that revenues plus net bond sales must equal total expenditures,
inclusive of government purchases, transfer payments, and interest payments on outstanding
government debt.
6C a l i b r a t i o n
The theoretical model described in section 5 and speciﬁed in appendix A cannot be solved
analytically, so we turn to numerical solutions. To that end, we need to assign values to
the model parameters. This section describes the calibration and appendix B describes the
solution method.
6.1 Data Figure 2 suggests a shift in the level of transfers and government spending
occurred between 1992 and 1997. Sweden’s ﬁnancial crisis started in 1992, while the ex-
penditure ceiling on central government spending was introduced in 1997. Claeys (2008)
identiﬁes the breakpoint for government spending as the third quarter of 1995 and for trans-
fers as the second quarter of 1996.12 We set the breakpoint to be 1997 in order to highlight
the comparison before and after the ﬁscal reform, but diﬀerent breakpoints do not aﬀect our
results qualitatively.
The degree of countercyclical behavior of government spending and transfers, as sum-
marized by the parameters αg and αz, is estimated using Swedish data during the period of
1980–2007. Productivity is deﬁned as real GDP per worker, transfers are the sum of social
security payments, net capital transfers and subsidies, and government spending is the sum
12Claeys (2008) uses the ratios of government spending over GDP and lump-sum transfers over GDP,
while we use the detrended data of government spending and transfers for reasons explained in section 4.
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of government ﬁnal consumption and consumption of ﬁxed capital.13 Table 1 shows the
estimated αg and αz during diﬀerent periods. The table also reports the average tax rate
and the ratios of government spending and transfers to GDP.14
1980–2007 1980–1997 1997–2007
Response of spending to productivity (αg) −0.246 −0.281 0.174
Response of transfers to productivity (αz) −1.816 −1.864 −1.13
Average tax rate (τ) 49.718 49.652 49.911
Spending-GDP ratio (g/y) 29.498 29.896 29.792
Transfers-GDP ratio (z/y) 21.193 22.49 19.106
Table 1: Swedish Fiscal Data (1980–2007).
Several important changes in Swedish ﬁscal behavior occurred between the two sub-
periods. First, there was a sharp decline in the level of transfer payments, from 22.5 to
about 19 percent of GDP. Second, government spending shifted from being countercyclical
in the early period (αg < 0) to being procyclical in the latter period (αg > 0). Figure 2 also
suggests that until the mid-1990s government spending seems to lead debt, whereas in more
recent years the relationship more closely mimics that between revenues and debt. This
change may be a consequence of the 1997 expenditure ceiling policy.
6.2 Parameter Calibration Table 2 summarizes the calibration of the parameters.
We take the model to operate at an annual frequency. The household discount rate is set to
be 0.95, which implies a net annual interest rate of 5.26 percent. Preferences are logarithmic,
so both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the Frisch labor supply elasticity are
unity. We assume that the household spends 25 percent of its time working. The total
amount of time and the productivity at steady state are normalized to 1. The productivity
shock is estimated using detrended data of real GDP per worker. Using a Hodrick and
Prescott (1997) ﬁlter, the shock has persistence of 0.661 and standard deviation of 0.015.
The degree of countercyclical government spending and lump-sum transfers (αg and αz),
and the transfers-GDP ratio (z/y) are calibrated to pre-crisis data (1980–1997) and post-
crisis data (1997–2007) for reasons explained in section 6.1. The steady-state tax rate (τ)
also depends on the regime, but it is calibrated slightly diﬀerent from the data. Although
table 1 shows that the average tax rate is slightly lower in the 1980–1997 period than in the
later period, the lower average tax rate is largely driven by a much smaller tax base during
13Data for real GDP per worker is from Penn World Trade Table (2009).
14The average tax rate is deﬁned as total tax revenue (including social security taxes, indirect taxes and
direct taxes) as a share of GDP.
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Parameter Value
Discount rate (β) 0.95
Steady state leisure (L) 0.75
Persistence of productivity (ρ) 0.661
Standard deviation of productivity (σ) 0.015
Response of taxes to debt (γ) 0.7
Spending-GDP ratio (g/y) 0.28
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
Response of spending to productivity (αg) −0.281 0.174
Response of transfers to productivity (αz) −1.864 −1.13
Average tax rate (τ) 0.51 0.49
Transfers-GDP ratio (z/y) 0.215 0.19
Table 2: Calibration of Model Parameters
the crisis from 1993–1997. In addition, the increase of the average tax rate in the later period
is likely due to ﬁscal consolidation, instead of reﬂecting the long-term trend of tax rates in
the post-crisis period. In fact, ﬁgure 2 shows that the average tax rate has been declining
since 2000. Flod´ en (2009) and others show that the ﬁscal reforms reduced the average tax
rate by about 6 percentage points from 2003 to 2009. Therefore, we calibrate the average
tax rate to be high in the pre-crisis period and low in the post-crisis period. Using data on
average tax rates and the debt-GDP ratio, the estimated response of taxes to government
debt is around 0.7, regardless of the period of estimation. The government spending-GDP
ratio is calibrated to 0.28, which is slightly lower than the data, but ensures that the model
produces a positive debt-GDP ratio in steady state.15
7 Distribution of the Fiscal Limit and Government Default
A ﬁscal limit emerges from this model because a higher distorting tax rate on labor has two
countervailing eﬀects. On the one hand, for a given tax base, higher rates raise revenues.
But on the other hand, higher rates reduce the after-tax return to labor, inducing agents to
consume more leisure, reducing the tax base. For a particular functional form for preferences,
we can obtain simple analytical expressions for the resulting Laﬀer curve.16
In a rational expectation equilibrium households will be willing to buy the debt at a risk-
free price if they expect that it is feasible for the government to fully honor its obligations.
15Given a steady-state interest rate, the calibration of government spending and transfers determines the
steady-state debt-GDP ratio via the government budget constraint. Applying the OECD’s deﬁnitions, net
debt is gross debt less the ﬁnancial assets of the government. In Sweden, net debt of the general government
diﬀers from the gross debt by a large margin due to pension funds.
16Technical details appear in appendix C.
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That is, by deﬁnition of an equilibrium, government policies are sustainable. Household’s
expectations are ratiﬁed by the presence of a tax rule that stabilizes debt. Most rational
expectations analyses of ﬁscal policy assume that the government is not only able to honor
its obligations, but that it is also willing to do so.
This paper distinguishes between the ability and the willingness of the government to
execute default-free policies. Even if the government is able to fulﬁll its promises, it may
choose not to. Because that choice is typically driven more by political than economic consid-
erations, we treat the choice as exogenous to prevailing economic conditions. In particular,
the decision to default is determined by a random draw, call it b∗
t, from the probability
distribution of the ﬁscal limit, which we approximate with a normal distribution, denoted
by N(B∗,σ 2
B)). In year t, b∗
t is the threshold level of the debt-GDP ratio. The decision to
default is quite simple: if the level of outstanding debt as a share of GDP is greater than or
equal to the threshold, then the government defaults by the amount Δt = δ;o t h e r w i s e ,t h e
government honors all of its liabilities. Δt is the fraction of outstanding debt on which the
government defaults. This is the object over which bond holders must form expectations in
order to correctly price government bonds.
We shortcut the political process by characterizing it as a random draw from the distri-
bution of the ﬁscal limit. Nonetheless, the decision to default is constrained by the economic
realities that determine the distribution from which the choice is drawn. In this sense, we
treat the government’s willingness to honor its obligations as a political decision that is not
merely a function of the state of the economy. And, naturally, the government’s willingness
must be constrained by its ability to support its outstanding debt.
As is clear from the derivation of the distribution B∗, the properties of the distribution
are determined by structural features of the economy—preferences, technologies, exogenous
shocks, and government policies. Bi (2009) shows how the ﬁscal limit depends on an econ-
omy’s diversiﬁcation, political uncertainty, the size of government, and the degree of coun-
tercyclicality in ﬁscal policies. These factors can change the mean and/or the dispersion of
the distribution.17
We turn now to examine how alternative ﬁscal policies—such as those that have been
adopted in Sweden—aﬀect the distribution of the ﬁscal limit.
17Bi (2009) modiﬁes (FL–IEC) to include an additional, possibly time-varying, political discount factor,
which reﬂects the political economy argument that governments and households may discount at diﬀerent
rates. If, for example, the political discount factor is less than 1, then the resulting distribution for B∗
t would
shift to the left, implying a lower average ﬁscal limit. This captures the possibility that political leaders may
be more impatient than private economic decision makers.
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8 Policy Experiments
We treat the model, calibrated to pre-crisis Swedish data (1980–1997), as the baseline. That
calibration uses the pre-crisis parameter values in table 2 for policy: government spending
and transfers are countercyclical and the average tax rate and share of transfers are “high.”
We simulate the distribution of the ﬁscal limit for this baseline calibration and then contrast
that distribution to the distributions obtained under alternative calibrations and alternative
rules governing spending and transfers policies.
8.1 Alternative Fiscal Policies We interpret the baseline model as reﬂecting the
ﬁscal situation, including the ﬁscal limit, in Sweden in the early 1990s when bond rating
agencies downgraded Swedish sovereign debt. To this distribution we contrast three alter-
native ﬁscal policies that are designed to capture some of the post-crisis reforms:
1. Post-Crisis: Calibrate the average tax rate and the transfers-GDP ratio to the post-
crisis parameter values in table 2 for 1997–2007, while assuming that spending and
transfers policies are countercyclical, as in the pre-crisis period.
2. Post-Crisis (procyclical): Calibrate the policy parameters to data in the post-crisis
period, which implies that government spending is procyclical.
3. Post-Crisis (expenditure ceiling): Adopt the post-crisis calibration for the average tax
rate and the share of transfers in GDP, while the cyclical behavior of spending and
transfers comes from the pre-crisis period, but add an expenditure ceiling on govern-
ment spending and transfers. This restricts the government to conduct countercyclical
expenditure policies only within some range. We consider one of many ways to im-
plement expenditure ceilings.18 The rules we impose operate asymmetrically when
spending and transfers policies are countercyclical. During good times, when produc-
tivity is high, expenditures will tend to be low and the constraints will not bind. When
times are bad and productivity is low, however, expenditures will automatically tend
to be higher than normal. If the productivity shock is suﬃciently bad, the automatic
expansion in expenditures may be bounded above, as the ceiling binds.19
Table 3 summarizes the policy settings in the baseline model and in the three alternatives
listed above. Case 1 is a counter-factual exercise that asks what the ﬁscal limit would be
if the government were to reduce the tax rate and transfers level to their post-crisis levels,
18Details are in appendix C.2.
19A natural extension to these speciﬁcations would add a “discretionary” spending component to the
automatic aspects of the rules. In this case, a bad output shock could force the government to choose
whether to cut “discretionary” or “non-discretionary” spending.
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but continued to follow the pre-crisis countercyclical expenditure rules. Cases 2 and 3 oﬀer
two explanations for government expenditures data from 1997 to 2007. Case 2 assumes that
government spending shifts from being countercyclical to become procyclical, while case 3
attempts to operationalize the expenditure ceiling rule.
Parameter Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Post-Crisis Post-Crisis
(procyclical) (ceiling)
Baseline Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Response of spending to productivity (αg) −0.281 −0.281 0.174 0.174
Response of transfers to productivity (αz) −1.864 −1.864 −1.13 −1.13
Average tax rate (τ) 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49
Transfers-GDP ratio (z/y) 0.215 0.19 0.19 0.19
Table 3: Alternative Fiscal Policies
8.2 Fiscal Limits Figure 4 compares the distributions of the ﬁscal limit under the
baseline model and the three alternative policies. The top panel plots the histogram for the
baseline model.20 The median of the ﬁscal limit—in terms of the debt-output ratio—in the
baseline (pre-crisis) calibration is about 80 percent of GDP, but the histogram suggests the
distribution has fairly fat tails. Fat tails mean that there is substantial probability of default
even at values of the debt-GDP ratio well below the average.
The bottom panel of the ﬁgure reports box plots of the ﬁscal limit distributions for the
baseline and the alternatives. Center lines in the boxes are medians, the vertical edges
of the boxes are 25th and 75th percentiles, the black vertical lines mark the most extreme
values that are not deemed to be outliers, and the outliers are marked by + symbols. The
pre-crisis distribution is centered at about a 0.78 debt-output ratio, but the distribution is
quite dispersed. Heavy representation of outliers suggests fat tails, with somewhat more
probability mass at low debt-GDP ratios. This distribution implies that during the early
1990s Swedish sovereign debt holders may have had good reason to place probability on
default, even when debt was at relatively modest levels. This, of course, was the time when
Swedish debt was downgraded from AAA to AA+.
Fiscal reforms that led to smaller government—in terms of the transfers-GDP ratio and
the average level of taxation—shifted the ﬁscal limit markedly to the right, as the box plot
20To simulate the ﬁscal limit, we draw 300 realizations of the productivity shock and compute the equilib-
rium time paths for all the variables in the model under the assumption that the tax rate is at the peak of
the Laﬀer curve. We discard the ﬁrst 200 draws as a burn-in period and compute B∗
1 as the discounted sum
of future surpluses, according to (FL–IEC). We repeat this 10,000 times and plot the resulting distribution
of B∗
1.
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labeled “Post-Crisis” indicates. The median moved to a bit above 100 percent. Although
the tails remain fat, at debt-output ratios of 65 percent or lower the probability of default
is essentially zero.21
The third box plot, labeled “Post (Procyclical),” uses identical policy settings as the sec-
ond plot except that government spending switches from counter- to procyclical (αg changes
from −0.281 to 0.174) and transfers become somewhat less countercyclical (αz changes from
−1.864 to −1.130). Altering the cyclical nature of government expenditures has little eﬀect
on the median of the distribution, but dramatically reduces its dispersion, as Bi (2009) also
found. Even debt-GDP ratios of 80 percent imply a negligible probability of default.
Expenditure ceilings have a more subtle inﬂuence on the distribution of the ﬁscal limit,
as the fourth box plot shows. Asymmetry in expenditure rules induces asymmetry in the
ﬁscal limit: the upper tail is substantially fatter than the lower tail, shifting risk away from
moderate debt-output ratios.
9 Quantitative Results
With the distributions of the ﬁscal limit in hand for various speciﬁcations of ﬁscal behavior,
we now turn to simulate the equilibrium of the model to examine the macroeconomic con-
sequences of an environment in which the eﬀective ﬁscal limit at each date, b∗
t, is a random
variable drawn from the model economy’s actual ﬁscal limit distribution.
9.1 Decision Rule The pricing rule for the interest rate on government bonds maps the
state of the economy into the yield on bonds, rt. Because it is possible for government to
default, rt reﬂects the probability that bond holders place on the government defaulting on
debt next period. For simplicity, we plot r as a function of the debt-output ratio, denoted
by r(b)i nﬁ g u r e5, ﬁxing productivity at its steady-state level. The model delivers the side-
ways S relationship between risk premia and government debt: at low debt-GDP ratios, risk
premia are very small; over certain ranges, however, premia rise rapidly with debt, before
ﬂattening out at high levels of debt.
Figure 5 compares the pricing rules under alternative policy speciﬁcations. The top panel
compares the pre-crisis and post-crisis cases in which transfers and spending policies behave
countercyclically. In the absence of default, the risk-free interest rate rises with debt, but
only very slightly, so the sharp run-ups in the decision rule are attributable almost entirely
to risk. In the pre-crisis baseline calibration, a sizable risk premium emerges when the debt-
GDP ratio reaches about 65 percent. In contrast, under the post-crisis calibration—which
entails a smaller government—the pricing function is ﬂat until the debt-GDP ratio rises to
21A similar result that “smaller” government raises the ﬁscal limit appears in Bi (2009).
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95 percent. This result suggests that reducing the average level of taxes and transfers may
contribute importantly to avoiding risk premia on government bonds.
The bottom panel compares the three post-crisis cases—countercyclical government spend-
ing (dashed line), procyclical government spending (solid line), and an expenditures ceiling
(dotted dashed line). Both procyclical spending and an expenditure ceiling extend the insen-
sitivity of interest rates to debt to higher levels of debt, relative to countercyclical spending
without a ceiling. Procyclical spending policy makes the function appreciably steeper, so
within a certain range of debt-output ratios, small increases in debt can lead to rapid in-
creases in interest rates. An expenditure ceiling can subdue the emergence of default risk
premium compared to either of the other two alternative policies by shifting probability mass
in the ﬁscal limit from low to high values of debt, as the bottom panel of ﬁgure 4 shows.
Taken together, the results for procyclical spending and expenditures ceiling policies provide
some support for the argument that such policies can cushion the Swedish economy from
risk premia on government debt.
The ﬁgure has important implications for empirical work seeking to ﬁnd a relationship
between debt and interest rates. Nonlinearity means that over a wide range of “low” levels of
debt, interest rates are quite insensitive to changes in debt. As debt levels rise, though, there
is a range over which interest rates move substantially with changes in debt. At very high
levels of debt, it is possible for the relationship to once again be quite weak. An empirical
ﬁnding that the correlation between interest rates and debt is small when debt is low cannot
be extrapolated to higher levels of debt. Moreover, since the ﬁscal limit, and therefore the
relationship between interest rates and debt, is time varying, it can be quite tricky to make
accurate predictions of how rates will change with debt.
9.2 Simulation We now simulate the model using as the driving process the actual time
path of the productivity shock from detrended Swedish data on labor productivity. The
economy is assumed to be in steady state in 1990 and is then hit by a sequence of negative
productivity shocks from 1991–1997, with no additional shocks hitting the economy from
1998 onward.22
Figure 6 reports the equilibrium paths of variables in the baseline model when actual
data on output per worker (labeled “Productivity”) from 1991 to 1997 is fed into the model.
These bad output disturbances begin in period 6 in the ﬁgure, continue through period
12, after which productivity decays smoothly back to steady state. Solid lines allow for
the possibility of default, when the default rate is 10 percent, and dashed lines come from
22Speciﬁcally, in the data in 1990 log(At/A)=0 .018 and the values of (At) from 1991 to 1997 are
(0.9758,0.9628,0.9404,0.9671,0.9770,0.9653,0.9700). To simulate the model we feed in these values for the
ﬁrst 7 years and then allow At to decay according to the autoregressive process in (2).
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imposing a default rate of 0. Diﬀerences between the lines arise entirely from the possibility
that the government may default. The upper right panel, labeled “Government Debt,” plots
the paths of equilibrium debt, the realized path of the stochastic default threshold (jagged
solid line showing b∗
t)d r a w nf r o mN(B∗,σ 2
b)—and two-standard-deviation bands around the
mean of the distribution for the ﬁscal limit (straight dashed lines). Whenever the path of
debt crosses the realized threshold, the government defaults by 10 percent on its outstanding
debt.
Bad productivity shocks raise government spending and transfers through their automatic
countercyclical response, increasing government debt substantially. Higher debt brings forth
higher tax rates, which ensure that government policy is sustainable. Because goods today
are scarce relative to goods in the future, the real interest rate rises sharply. Low produc-
tivity and high tax rates discourage work eﬀort, reducing both output and consumption.
Reinforcing the elevated level of debt are the higher interest payments induced by both
higher principle and higher interest rates. Along the transition path, debt remains close
to the lower two-standard-deviation band. Although in this simulation no default occurs,
the possibility of default keeps the interest rate elevated for an extended period, as govern-
ment debt retires back to steady state only very slowly. Note that the possibility of default
has deleterious eﬀects on hours worked and consumption, though in this simulation, those
additional impacts are quite small.
Figure 6 also illustrates an important lesson for empirical studies. Risk premia, driven by
increases in default probabilities, can emerge even when no actual default occurs. For this
reason, it may not be productive to restrict empirical analyses of the relationship between
interest rates and ﬁscal policy to samples in which governments have defaulted.
The interest rate in ﬁgure 6 is a short, one-period rate. Most government debt carries
a longer maturity. Longer maturities lead to the possibility that long-term interest rates
might provide an “early-warning signal” of default fears. It is straightforward to use the
theoretical model to price longer-maturity bonds according to an asset-pricing formula to
obtain the prices for a bond sold in period t that matures in period t + n. Longer maturity
bond prices will tend to move before shorter maturity bond prices in response to news about
defaults farther into the future.
Figure 7 illustrates that long-term bonds give advance warnings of sovereign defaults in
a severe recession.23 Expected high government indebtedness in the future results in a rise
in current risk premia of long-term bonds, even when the premia on short-term bonds show
no increase at all. The longer the bond maturity, the earlier the default risk premia emerge.
Figure 8 examines how the economy would perform in the face of the same sequence
23This exercise conditions on the same sequence of bad productivity shocks as in ﬁgure 6.
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of bad productivity shocks as in ﬁgure 6, but under the three alternative ﬁscal policies.
Each alternative calibrates steady state transfers and taxes to be lower than in the pre-crisis
environment that ﬁgure 6 depicts. In all case, because the post-crisis calibration shifts the
distribution of the ﬁscal limit sharply to the right, as shown in ﬁgure 4, the run-up in debt
stays well below the tail of the distribution and policy remains essentially risk-free. This
result suggests that the ﬁscal reforms may cushion Swedish debt from the wrath of ﬁnancial
markets, should the economy be hit again by shocks like those in the early 1990s.
Procyclical government spending (dashed blue lines) and the expenditures ceiling (solid
black lines) have similar consequences for the paths of hours worked, consumption, tax rates,
interest rates, and debt, although their implications for the paths of spending and transfers
are quite diﬀerent. The similarities arise because the procyclical spending policy lowers
spending, while transfers continue to behave countercyclically and rise. Both components
of expenditures rise under the ceiling policy, but the total change in spending and transfers
under the two policies is approximately the same. With nearly identical consequences for
debt expansion and tax rates, the two policies aﬀect the macro economy is very similar ways.
Countercyclical spending policy, in contrast, has important diﬀerent eﬀects on the econ-
omy (dotted dashed red lines). In this case, both spending and transfers rise sharply in
response to the economic downturn, pushing debt higher. More debt carries with it higher
tax obligations, which suppress work eﬀort and consumption. Although debt rises more, it
remains well away from the ﬁscal limit, ensuring little, if any, risk premia.
10 Concluding Remarks
This paper is but a ﬁrst step toward studying the tradeoﬀs between short-run ﬁscal stimu-
lus and long-run sustainability. The next step is to extend the model to allow expansions
in government spending and transfers to stimulate aggregate demand and overall economic
activity. As an empirical matter, the jury is still out on whether government spending mul-
tipliers are large enough to rationalize the use of ﬁscal stimulus through spending measures.
But we know it is possible to write down theoretical models in which government spending is
eﬃcacious. Extending the present setup to include a beneﬁcial role for countercyclical ﬁscal
policy will give the analysis broader applicability.
Another extension that is important for conclusions about both ﬁscal stimulus and sus-
tainability is to model monetary policy. Recent work has found that interactions between
monetary and ﬁscal policies—particularly the possibility that monetary policy may be op-
erating at or near the lower bound on nominal interest rates—can play an important role in
determining the size of ﬁscal multipliers [Christiano et al. (2009), Davig and Leeper (2009),
Eggertsson (2009)]. Moreover, in the presence of a ﬁscal limit, monetary policy’s ability to
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control inﬂation can be jeopardized [Sims (2004, 2009), Cochrane (2009), Davig et al. (2010),
Leeper (2009b)].
When examining an economy like Sweden’s, it is natural to embed this analysis in a
small open economy. Such an extension of the present model is immediate and unlikely to
alter the major results. First, the distribution of the ﬁscal limit is independent of whether
the economy is a closed or open. So long as the government collects distortionary taxes,
there exists dynamic Laﬀer curve and, therefore, there is a distribution of the ﬁscal limit.
Second, both international and domestic investors care about default risk, which is the
expected default rate in the bond pricing equation. One diﬀerence between international and
domestic investors arises because the saving decision of domestic investors is also aﬀected
by future tax policy, as the government’s future liabilities may change in the face of default.
The magnitude of the second eﬀect depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Logarithmic utility ensures that the second eﬀect is trivial, and a risk premium decomposition
shows that 95 percent of the risk premium comes from the expected default rate. This implies
that the quantitative results will stay almost the same even if the economy were to open
up. On the other hand, the results could be sensitive to the assumption of openness if the
government issues nominal debt.
It is unlikely, however, that such extensions will alter a key conclusion from the present
analysis: the right kinds of ﬁscal reforms—speciﬁcally, the adoption of certain classes of
ﬁscal rules—can shift the economy’s ﬁscal limit in important ways and dramatically reduce
the likelihood that sovereign debt will be assessed a risk premium, even in the face of bad
economic shocks like those that hit Sweden in the 1990s.
There is a growing body of work on ﬁscal rules in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models in which the maintained assumption is that government debt is risk-free [Kumhof and
Laxton (2009, 2008), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005, 2006), Kirsanova et al. (2006b)]. There
is room for extending this analysis to models in which government debt may be risky. One
question to address is: to what class of economic disturbances is a given set of rules robust
in the sense of ensuring that policy mimics the risk-free outcome?
As the results of sections 8 and 9 make clear, alternative ﬁscal policies can have quanti-
tatively important consequences for an economy’s ﬁscal limit. The distribution of the ﬁscal
limit, in turn, has consequences for risk premia and economic performance. It is useful
to study implementable and veriﬁable ﬁscal rules and trace out their implications for the
distribution of ﬁscal limits across countries.
Finally, it is worthwhile, to the extent possible, to use formal models to study the con-
sequences of various proposals for the formulation of ﬁscal policy councils of the kind that
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Sweden and Hungary, among other countries, have adopted.24 Simon Wren-Lewis and his
co-authors have made substantial progress along these lines [Kirsanova et al. (2006a), Wren-
Lewis (2008)]. It is likely that embedding the possibility of sovereign debt default will
strengthen those arguments in favor of subjecting government ﬁscal decisions to indepen-
dent scrutiny.
24See, for example, von Hagen and Harden (1994), Wyplosz (2005, 2008), Calmfors (2009), Leeper (2009a).
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Government Spending vs. GDP



































Government Spending vs. Debt
























































































Figure 1: Swedish data. Left panels plot three ﬁscal variables—transfers, government spend-
ing, and revenues as shares of GDP—(solid lines, measured on right axes) and detrended
real GDP (dashed lines, measured on left axes). Right panels plot the ﬁscal variables and
the debt-GDP ratio.
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Government Spending vs. Debt








































































































Figure 2: Swedish data. Left panels plot detrended values of three ﬁscal variables—transfers,
government spending, and revenues—(solid lines, measured on right axes) and detrended real
GDP (dashed lines, measured on left axes). Right panels plot the detrended ﬁscal variables
and the debt-GDP ratio.
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Frisch Elasticity = 0.5
Frisch Elasticity = 1.0
Frisch Elasticity = 3.0
Figure 3: Simple Laﬀer curves from steady state version of the theoretical model. Plotted for
three elasticities of labor supply, ranging from relatively inelastic (0.5) to relatively elastic
(3.0).
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Figure 4: Distribution of the ﬁscal limit. Top panel plots the distribution of ﬁscal limit
under the pre-crisis calibration; bottom panel compares the distribution under the pre-
crisis calibration and three alternative calibrations: post-crisis, post-crisis with procyclical
government spending and post-crisis with expenditure ceiling.
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Figure 5: Net interest rate as a function of debt-GDP ratio. Pricing rules under diﬀerent
calibrations when technology is at its steady-state level. Top panel compares the pre-crisis
case to the post-crisis case with countercyclical government spending. Bottom panel com-
pares three post-crisis cases: countercyclical government spending, an expenditure ceiling,
and procyclical government spending.
29Bi & Leeper: Risk Premia and Fiscal Policy in Sweden






































































Figure 6: Eﬀects of a sequence of negative technology shocks under pre-crisis calibration.
Path of technology for 1991–1997 from Swedish data is fed into model, assuming the economy
is in steady state in 1990. Dashed blue lines represent a stochastic default scheme (δ =0 .1)
and solid black lines represent a default-free scheme (δ = 0). Time units in years.
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Figure 7: Risk premia on long-term bonds with diﬀerent maturities computed using a simu-
lation, conditioning on the path of technology shocks in ﬁgure 6 under pre-crisis calibration.
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Figure 8: Eﬀects of a sequence of negative technology shocks under alternative ﬁscal policies.
Path of technology for 1991–1997 from Swedish data is fed into calibrated model, assuming
the economy is in steady state in 1990. Countercyclical government spending (dotted dashed
red lines); procyclical government spending (dashed blue lines); government expenditure
ceiling (solid black lines). Time units in years.
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A The Formal Model
Goods are produced using a technology that is linear in hours worked, 1 − Lt, whose pro-
ductivity is determined by the realization of productivity, At. The economy’s production
technology is
yt = At(1 − Lt)( 1 )







+ ut ut ∼N(0,σ
2)( 2 )
with 0 ≤ ρ<1.
Total supply of goods at each date is consumed, either by households, ct,o rb yt h e
government, gt, so the aggregate resource constraint for the economy is
ct + gt = At(1 − Lt)( 3 )
A.1 Household Consumers receive after-tax income, At(1−τt)(1−Lt), lump-sum trans-
fers, zt, and payoﬀs from government bonds they purchased in the previous period, bd
t. With
these sources of income, consumers buy goods and new government bonds, bt,t h a ts e l la t
price qt. Because the government may choose to default, at least partially, on its liabilities
to consumers, bd
t =( 1−Δt)bt−1,w h e r eΔ t ∈ [0,1] is the fraction of outstanding liabilities on
which the government defaults, so bd
t denotes post-default government liabilities. We date
post-default liabilities at t because, although the liabilities are carried over from t − 1, the
value of Δt is not known until period t.
The representative household behaves competitively and chooses consumption, leisure,





tu(ct,L t), 0 <β<1, (4)
subject to its budget constraint




taking as given prices and policies, {τt,z t,q t,Δt}. Et is the mathematical expectation that
is conditional on time t information, consisting of all variables dated t and earlier, including
the sovereign default information at time t. β is the discount factor. u(c,L) is strictly
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where we employ the notation uz(s) ≡ ∂u(cs,L s)/∂zs. Expression (6) equates the house-
hold’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the after-tax return
to labor (equivalent to the after-tax wage rate). Dynamics enter the household’s saving
decision because bonds bought today do not pay oﬀ until the future. This dynamic appears
in equation (7), which links the government bond price to the household’s expectation of
sovereign default in the next period, Δt+1.
Random ﬂuctuations in technology make the household’s income volatile. Concave utility
implies that the household seeks to smooth its consumption plan by saving in periods when
income is high and dissaving when income is low. In this simple model, the household
smooths its consumption in the face of income ﬂuctuations by adjusting its bond holdings.
Naturally, optimizing households will want to avoid either over- or under-accumulating
government bonds. For example, if the household saves too much, then it is achieving a lower
consumption path and, therefore, lower utility, than it otherwise could. This consideration
leads to the household’s transversality condition
lim
T→∞







1−Δt+T . Because the transversality condition, (8), is one
of the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimization, its satisfaction is part of the
deﬁnition of an equilibrium.
Transversality has important implications. An immediate implication derives from sub-





uc(t + T + 1)(1 − Δt+T+1)
uc(t)(1 − Δt)
bt+T =0 ( 9 )
Expression (9) reveals that the prices the household uses to value government debt depend
on both the household’s marginal rate of substitution and on the expected default fraction.
We discuss further implications below.
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A.2 Government Government in this model behaves as an automaton: unlike the house-
hold, which solves an explicit optimization problem, the government obeys simple ad hoc
rules in setting its ﬁscal instruments and must ensure that its choices satisfy its budget
constraint
τtAt(1 − Lt)+btqt =( 1− Δt)bt−1   
bd
t
+gt + zt (10)
The bond contract is not enforceable. At time t, the government may partially default
on its outstanding liabilities, bt−1, at the rate of Δt. The decision to default is quite simple:
if the level of debt outstanding exceeds some threshold, b∗
t, then the government defaults by
the fraction δ; otherwise, the government fully honors its debt commitments. The default
fraction is given by
Δt =
	
0i f bt−1 <b ∗
t
δ if bt−1 ≥ b∗
t
where b∗
t is a random draw from the distribution of ﬁscal limit, N(B∗,σ 2
B). We return to a
detailed discussion of the ﬁscal limit below. The random nature of b∗
t reﬂects the fact that
debt renegotiation involves political considerations from which we abstract and which we
do not model. This simple rule for determining whether the government (partially) defaults
on its debt makes clear that this paper does not address the strategic issue of why the
government may choose to default. From the government’s perspective, default is costless
in this model, so there is no scope to examine the tradeoﬀs the government faces when it
decides to default.
Government spending and tax decisions are governed by time-invariant rules. Cyclical
patterns in government spending and lump-sum transfers are induced by rules that allow
transfers and purchases to respond systematically with technology, which is the source of

















Variables without subscripts in (11)a n d( 12) denote steady state values, so these rules
are written in terms of deviations from steady state. When the α parameters are positive
(negative), transfers and spending are procyclical (countercyclical).25
The tax policy rule sets deviations of the income tax rate from steady state as a function
25More commonly, cyclicality is deﬁned in terms of comovements with output, rather than technology. In
the present model, there is no important economic distinction between output and technology, whereas the
use of technology is computationally easier.
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of deviations of post-default liabilities from steady state debt








To bring debt back to steady state, taxes must adjust enough to both service any new
debt issuances and eventually retire those new issuances. This assumption about tax policy
behavior appears to be consistent with the casual empirical evidence oﬀered in ﬁgures 1 and
2.
Throughout the paper we maintain the tax policy in (13), even when we consider alter-
native policies for how transfers and government spending are determined.
A.3 The Model’s Laffer Curve Prescott (2006) argues that a Frish elasticity of 3
is consistent with macro data, while studies using micro data suggest an estimation in the
range of 0 to 1. Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) survey this literature.
In the benchmark model, preferences are assumed to be u(ct,L t) = logct+φlogLt,w h e r e










where n is the labor supply at steady state. Since we assume the household spends 25 percent
of its time working (n =0 .25), the Frish elasticity is 3 in the benchmark model.
Alternatively, if we assume preferences to be u(ct,L t) = logct + φL
1+ 1
ψ










If ψ =0 .33 and n =0 .25, then the Frisch elasticity is 1.
Figure 3 compares the model’s Laﬀer curves for three diﬀerent Frisch elasticities. Even
though a lower elasticity leads to a larger revenue-maximizing tax rate, the Frisch elasticity
has only a modest impact on the overall position of the Laﬀer curve.
B The Solution Method
We solve the model using the monotone map method described by Coleman (1991) and
Davig (2004). The procedure conjectures candidate decision rules that reduce the system of
equations characterizing the equilibrium to a set of expectation ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equa-
tions and then iterates to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point in the space of decision rules. The state of
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the economy in this model consists of the realization of the technology shock, At,a n dt h e
post-default level of liabilities, bd





denote the state at t. Then the decision
rule maps ψt into the endogenous state variable, bt.26 The equilibrium mapping is denoted
by the function bt = fb(ψt).
The complete model can be reduced to a single equation:
bd
















Given a realization of the state, ψt and expectations at date t of technology, At+1 and the
draw of the ﬁscal limit, b∗
t+1, next period, the monotone map solves for the decision rule,
fb(ψt), that solves (16). The expectation on the right-hand side is evaluated using numerical
quadrature, integrating over the conditional probability distributions for technology and the
ﬁscal limit.
C Computation of Fiscal Limit
Household consumption and labor supply depend only on the income tax rate and the ex-
ogenous state variable, At (recall that gt is a function of At). When the utility function is
u(c,L) = logc + φlogL, the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions can be written as
1 − Lt =
At(1 − τt)+φgt
At(1 + φ − τt)
(17)
ct =
(At − gt)(1 − τt)
1+φ − τt
(18)




=( 1 + 2 φ)At − φgt −

At(1 + φ − τt)+




Tax revenues reach their the maximum level, T max
t , when the tax rate reaches the peak of
the Laﬀer curve. Denote the tax rate that maximizes revenue by τmax
t . These critical tax
26Note the state variable bd
t =( 1 − Δt)bt−1 incorporates two dimensions of information: the default
threshold at time t, b∗
t, and the pre-default level of government liabilities, bt−1.
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parameters can be obtained analytically as
τ
max
t =1 + φ −






t =( 1 + 2 φ)At − φG(At) − 2

(1 + φ)φAt(At −G(At)) (21)
G(At)s h o w st h a tgt is a function of At. At each date t, the peak of the Laﬀer curve is
determined by preference parameters and the realizations of technology. In this sense, the
ﬁscal limit is both model-speciﬁc and dynamic [see, for example, Trabandt and Uhlig (2009)].
The resulting ﬁscal limit at t, denoted B∗
t, is the expected sum of the discounted ﬁscal













t+h − gt+h − zt+h) (22)
where umax
c (·) denotes marginal utility evaluated at the allocations associated with τmax
t .T h e
stochastic default threshold is a random draw from N(B∗,σ 2
B).
C.1 Technical Explanation of Fiscal Limit It is important to emphasize that the
ﬁscal limit is independent of the equilibrium conditions of the model.
The size of tax adjustment parameter, γ, determines the existence of unique equilibrium.
For a given set of structural parameters and shock process, there exists an adjustment
threshold, denoted as γmin, such that any γ below the threshold may lead to indeterminacy.
However, the ﬁscal limit, B∗
t, does not depend on γ.E q u a t i o n( 21) shows that other than
the structural parameters of the model, τmax
t only depends on the realization of technology
at time t.S o d o cmax
t , Lmax
t and T max
t , which denote consumption, labor supply and tax





At(1 − τmax(At)) + φG(At)










t =( 1 + 2 φ)At − φG(At) − 2

(1 + φ)φAt(At −G(At)) (25)
Therefore, (22) shows that the resulting ﬁscal limit, B∗
t, only depends on At and structural
parameters. It is irrelevant to the government tax policy and, therefore, the tax adjustment
parameter γ.
Note that the default scheme we consider in this paper is diﬀerent from a “pure” endoge-
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nous default which is an outcome when transversality condition fails to hold under given
current and expected future ﬁscal policy. In other words, such a “pure” endogenous default
may arise if the current government liability, bt, surpasses the sum of discounted future ﬁscal








h uc(t + h)
uc(t)




The problem with the “pure” endogenous default is that such defaults will never happen in
equilibrium in our model – if γ is suﬃciently large, then the government never defaults; if γ
is smaller than γmin, then there is indeterminacy.
C.2 Alternative Fiscal Policies We interpret the baseline model as reﬂecting the
ﬁscal limit in Sweden in the early 1990s when bond rating agencies downgraded Swedish
sovereign debt. To this distribution we contrast three alternative ﬁscal policies that are
designed to capture some of the post-crisis reforms:
1. Post-Crisis: Calibrate τ and z/y to the post-crisis parameter values in table 2 for
1997–2007, while assuming αg and αz take on the same countercyclical values as in the
pre-crisis period.
2. Post-Crisis (procyclical): Calibrate αg, αz, τ and z/y to data in the post-crisis period,
which implies that government spending is procyclical.
3. Post-Crisis (expenditure ceiling): Adopt the post-crisis calibration—τ and z/y take
values from 1997–2007, while αg and αz take values from pre-crisis period—but add an
expenditure ceiling on government spending and transfers. This restricts the govern-
ment to conduct countercyclical expenditure policies to within some range. Speciﬁcally,

























where σ is one standard deviation for the technology shock.
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